{"id":77,"date":"2023-01-20T12:04:12","date_gmt":"2023-01-20T12:04:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/?page_id=77"},"modified":"2023-01-20T12:04:25","modified_gmt":"2023-01-20T12:04:25","slug":"browser-wars","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/browser-wars\/","title":{"rendered":"Browser Wars"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><em>Audio Version by Jeremy Keith<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-audio\"><audio controls src=\"https:\/\/css-tricks.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/Chapter_10_Browser_Wars.mp3\"><\/audio><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/css-tricks.com\/category\/history\/feed\">Articles RSS<\/a>&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/adactio.s3.amazonaws.com\/audio\/narration\/web_history\/podcast.xml\">Audio RSS<\/a> \u00b7 <a href=\"https:\/\/podcasts.apple.com\/podcast\/web-history\/id1535003098\">iTunes<\/a>&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/open.spotify.com\/show\/0vR1DIKcA0DH8904tAOHSd\">Spotify<\/a>&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/overcast.fm\/itunes1535003098\/web-history\">Overcast<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>In June of 1995, representatives from Microsoft arrived at the Netscape offices. The stated goal was to find ways to work together\u2014Netscape as the single dominant force in the browser market and Microsoft as a tech giant just beginning to consider the implications of the Internet. Both groups, however, were suspicious of ulterior motives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Marc Andreessen was there. He was already something of a web celebrity. Newly appointed Netscape CEO James Barksdale also came. On the Microsoft side was a contingent of product managers and engineers hoping to push Microsoft into the Internet market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The meeting began friendly enough, as the delegation from Microsoft shared what they were working on in the latest version of their operating system, Windows 95. Then, things began to sour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/archive.nytimes.com\/www.nytimes.com\/library\/tech\/98\/10\/biztech\/articles\/22microsoft-antitrust.html\">accounts from Netscape<\/a>, \u201cMicrosoft offered to make an investment in Netscape and give Netscape\u2019s software developers crucial technical information about the Windows operating system if Netscape would agree not to make a browser for [the] Windows 95 operating system.\u201d If that was to be believed, Microsoft would have tiptoed over the line of what is legal. The company would be threatening to use its monopoly to squash competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Andreessen, no stranger to dramatic flair, would later dress the meeting up with a nod to&nbsp;<em>The Godfather<\/em>&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbsnews.com\/htdocs\/microsoft\/key_issues_netscape.html\">in his deposition to the Department of Justice<\/a>: \u201cI expected to find a bloody computer monitor in my bed the next day.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Microsoft&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/archive\/politics\/1998\/10\/27\/netscape-justice-accused-of-a-setup\/1f87f797-ee91-4dae-ad40-1e7cb5b79373\/\">claimed the meeting was a \u201csetup,\u201d<\/a>&nbsp;initiated by Netscape to bait them into a comprising situation they could turn to their advantage later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There are a few different places to mark the beginning of the browser wars. The release of Internet Explorer 1, for instance (late summer, 1995). Or the day Andreessen called out Microsoft as nothing but a \u201cpoorly debugged set of device drivers\u201d (early 1995). But June 21, 1995\u2014when Microsoft and Netscape came to a meeting as conceivable friends and left as bitter foes\u2014may be the most definitive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>Andreessen called it \u201cfree, but not free.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Here\u2019s how it worked. When the Netscape browser was released it came with fee of $39 per copy. That was officially speaking. But fully function Netscape beta versions were free to download for their website. And universities and non-profits could easily get zero-cost licenses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For the upstarts of the web revolution and open source tradition, Netscape was free enough. For the buttoned-up corporations buying in bulk with specific contractual needs, they could license the software for a reasonable fee. Free, but not free. \u201cIt looks free optically, but it is not,\u201d a Netscape employee would later describe it. \u201cCorporations have to pay for it. Maintenance has to be paid.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cIt\u2019s basically a Microsoft lesson, right?\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Architects-Web-Built-Future-Business\/dp\/0471171875\">was how Andreessen framed it<\/a>. \u201cIf you get ubiquity, you have a lot of options, a lot of ways to benefit from that.\u201d If people didn\u2019t have a way to get quick and easy access to Netscape, it would never spread. It was a lesson Andreessen had learned behind his computer terminal at the NCSA research lab at the University of Illinois.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/css-tricks.com\/chapter-2-browsers\/\">Just a year prior<\/a>, he and his friends built the wildly successful, cross-platform Mosaic browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Andreessen worked on Mosaic for several years in the early \u201990\u2019s. But he began to feel cramped by increasing demands from higher-ups at NCSA hoping to capitalize on the browser\u2019s success. At the end of 1993, Andreessen headed west, to stake his claim in Silicon Valley. That\u2019s where he met James Clark.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/marc-andreessen-and-jim-clark-the-founders-of-netscape.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354926\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Netscape Communications Corporation co-founders Jim Clark, left, and Marc Andreessen (AP Photo\/HO)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Clark had just cut ties with Silicon Graphics, the company he created. A legend in the Bay Area, Clark was well known in the valley. When he saw the web for the first time, someone suggested he meet with Andreessen. So he did. The two hit it off immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Clark\u2014with his newly retired time and fortune\u2014brought an inner circle of tech visionaries together for regular meetings. \u201cFor the invitees, it seemed like a wonderful opportunity to talk about ideas, technologies, strategies,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Speeding-Net-Netscape-Challenged-Microsoft\/dp\/0871137097\">one account would later put it<\/a>. \u201cFor Clark, it was the first step toward building a team of talented like-minded people who populate his new company.\u201d Andreessen, still very much the emphatic and relentless advocate of the web, increasingly moved to the center of this circle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The duo considered several ideas. None stuck. But they kept coming back to one. Building the world\u2019s first commercial browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And so, on a snowy day in mid-April 1994, Andreessen and Clark took a flight out to Illinois. They were there with a single goal: Hire the members of the original Mosaic team still working at the NCSA lab for their new company. They went straight to the lobby of a hotel just outside the university. One by one, Clark met with five of the people who had helped create Mosaic (plus Lou Montulli, creator of Lynx and a student at University of Kansas) and offered them a job.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right in a hotel room, Clark printed out contracts with lucrative salaries and stock options. Then he&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Architects-Web-Built-Future-Business\/dp\/0471171875\">told them the mission of his new company<\/a>. \u201cIts mandate\u2014<em>Beat Mosaic!<\/em>\u2014was clear,\u201d one employee recalled. By the time Andreessen and Clark flew back to California the next day, they\u2019d have the six new employees of the soon-to-be-named Netscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Within six months they would release their first browser\u2014Netscape Navigator. Six months after that, the easy-to-use, easy-to-install browser, would overrun the market and bring millions of users online for the first time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Clark, speaking to the chaotic energy of the browser team and the speed at which they built software that changed the world, would later say Netscape gave \u201canarchy credibility.\u201d Writer John Cassidy&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.harpercollins.com\/products\/dotcon-john-cassidy\">puts that into context<\/a>. \u201cAnarchy in the post-Netscape sense meant that a group of college kids could meet up with a rich eccentric, raise some money from a venture capitalist, and build a billion-dollar company in eighteen months,\u201d adding, \u201cAnarchy was capitalism as personal liberation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>Inside of Microsoft were a few restless souls.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Internet, and the web, was passing the tech giant by. Windows was the most popular operating system in the world\u2014a virtual monopoly. But that didn\u2019t mean they weren\u2019t vulnerable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As early as 1993, three employees at Microsoft\u2014Steven Sinofsky, J. Allard, and Benjamin Slivka\u2014began to sound the alarms. Their uphill battle to make Microsoft realize the promise of the Internet is documented in the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/1996-07-14\/inside-microsoft\">\u201cInside Microsoft\u201d<\/a>&nbsp;profile penned by Kathy Rebell, which published in Bloomberg in 1996. \u201cI dragged people into my office kicking and screaming,\u201d Sinofsky told Rebello, \u201cI got people excited about this stuff.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Some employees believed Microsoft was distracted by a need to control the network. Investment poured into a proprietary network, like CompuServe or Prodigy, called the Microsoft Network (or MSN). Microsoft wanted to control the entire networked experience. But MSN would ultimately be a huge failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Slivka and Allard believed Microsoft was better positioned to build with the Internet rather than compete against it. \u201cMicrosoft needs to ensure that we ride the success of the Web, instead of getting drowned by it,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/pstella.com\/reading\/THEWEB.pdf\">wrote Slivka in some of his internal communication<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Allard went a step further, drafting an internal memo named \u201cWindows: The Next Killer Application for the Internet.\u201d Allard\u2019s approach, laid out in the document, would soon be the cornerstone of Microsoft\u2019s Internet strategy. It consisted of three parts. First,&nbsp;<strong>embrace<\/strong>&nbsp;the open standards of the web. Second,&nbsp;<strong>extend<\/strong>&nbsp;its technology to the Microsoft ecosystem. Finally (and often forgotten),&nbsp;<strong>innovate<\/strong>&nbsp;and improve web technologies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After a failed bid to acquire BookLink\u2019s InternetWorks browser in 1994\u2014AOL swooped in and outbid them\u2014Microsoft finally got serious about the web. And their meeting with Netscape didn\u2019t yield any results. Instead, they negotiated a deal with NCSA\u2019s commercial partner Spyglass to license Mosaic for the first Microsoft browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Internet_Explorer_version_history#Microsoft_Internet_Explorer_1.x\">In August of 1995<\/a>, Microsoft released Internet Explorer version 1.0. It wasn\u2019t very original, based on code that Spyglass had licensed to dozens of other partners. Shipped as part of an Internet Jumpstart add-on, the browser was bare-bones, clunkier and harder to use than what Netscape offered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/ds0VOvGHJOY?feature=oembedSource:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=ds0VOvGHJOY\">Web Design Museum<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On December 7th, Bill Gates hosted a large press conference on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. He opened with news about the Microsoft Network, the star of the show. But he also demoed Internet Explorer,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/atr\/legacy\/2006\/03\/03\/502.pdf\">borrowing language directly from Allard\u2019s proposal<\/a>. \u201cSo the Internet, the competition will be kind of, once again, embrace and extend,\u201d Gates announced, \u201cAnd we will embrace all the popular Internet protocols\u2026 We will do some extensions to those things.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Microsoft had entered the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>Like many of her peers, Rosanne Siino began learning the world of personal computing on her own. After studying English in college\u2014with an eye towards journalism\u2014Siino found herself at a PR firm with clients like Dell and Seagate. Siino was naturally curious and resourceful, and read trade magazines and talked to engineers to learn what she could about personal computing in the information age.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>She developed a special talent for taking the language and stories of engineers and translating them into bold visions of the future. Friendly, and always engaging, Siino built up a Rolodex of trade publication and general media contacts along the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After landing a job at Silicon Graphics, Siino worked closely with James Clark (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Netscape-Time-Billion-Dollar-Start-Up-Microsoft\/dp\/0312199341\">he would later remark she was<\/a>&nbsp;\u201cone of the best PR managers at SGI\u201d). She identified with Clark\u2019s restlessness when he made plans to leave the company\u2014an exit she helped coordinate\u2014and decided if the opportunity came to join his new venture, she\u2019d jump ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>A few months later, she did. Siino was employee number 19 at Netscape; its first public relations hire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>When Siino arrived at the brand new Netscape offices in Mountain View, the first thing she did was sit down and talk to each one of the engineers. She wanted to hear\u2014straight from the source\u2014what the vision of Netscape was. She heard a few things. Netscape was building a \u201ckiller application,\u201d one that would make other browsers irrelevant. They had code that was better, faster, and easier to use than anything out there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Siino knew she couldn\u2019t sell good code. But a young and hard working group of fresh-out-of-college transplants from rural America making a run at entrenched Silicon Valley; that was something she could sell. \u201cWe had this twenty-two-year-old kid who was pretty damn interesting and I thought, \u2018There\u2019s a story right there,&#8217;\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Architects-Web-Built-Future-Business\/dp\/0471171875\/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&amp;keywords=architects+of+the+web&amp;qid=1633650701&amp;s=books&amp;sr=1-1\">she later said in an interview for the book&nbsp;<em>Architects of the Web<\/em><\/a>, \u201c\u2018And we had this crew of kids who had come out from Illinois and I thought, \u2018There\u2019s a story there too.&#8217;\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Inside of Netscape, some executives and members of the board had been talking about an IPO. With Microsoft hot on their heels, and competitor Spyglass launching a successful IPO of their own, timing was critical. \u201cBefore very long, Microsoft was sure to attack the Web browser market in a more serious manner,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.harpercollins.com\/products\/dotcon-john-cassidy\">writer John Cassidy explains<\/a>, \u201cIf Netscape was going to issue stock, it made sense to do so while the competition was sparse.\u201d Not to mention, a big, flashy IPO was just what the company needed to make headlines all around the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the months leading up to the IPO, Siino crafted a calculated image of Andreeseen for the press. She positioned him as a leader of the software generation, an answer to the now-stodgy, Silicon-driven hardware generation of the 60\u2019s and 70\u2019s. In interviews and profiles, Siino made sure Andreeseen came off as a whip-smart visionary ready to tear down the old ways of doing things; the \u201cnew Bill Gates.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That required a fair bit of cooperation from Andreeseen. \u201cMy other real challenge was to build up Marc as a persona,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.internethistorypodcast.com\/2018\/06\/173-netscapes-rosanne-siino\/\">she would later say<\/a>. Sometimes, Andreessen would complain about the interviews, \u201cbut I\u2019d be like, \u2018Look, we really need to do this.\u2019 And he\u2019s savvy in that way. He caught on.&#8217;\u201d Soon, it was almost natural, and as Andreeseen traveled around with CEO James Barksdale to talk to potential investors ahead of their IPO, Netscape hype continued to inflate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>August 9, 1995, was the day of the Netscape IPO. Employees buzzed around the Mountain View offices, too nervous to watch the financial news beaming from their screens or the TV. \u201cIt was like saying don\u2019t notice the pink elephant dancing in your living room,\u201d [Siino said later]. They shouldn\u2019t have worried. In its first day of trading, the Netscape stock price rose 108%. It was best opening day for a stock on Wall Street. Some of the founding employees went to bed that night millionaires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Not long after, Netscape released version 2 of their browser. It was their most ambitious release to date. Bundled in the software were tools for checking email, talking with friends, and writing documents. It was sleek and fast. The Netscape homepage that booted up each time the software started sported all sorts of nifty and well-known web adventures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Not to mention JavaScript. Netscape 2 was the first version to ship with Java applets, small applications run directly in the browser. With Java, Netscape aimed to compete directly with Microsoft and their operating system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To accompany the release, Netscape recruited young programmer Brendan Eich to work on a scripting language that riffed on Java. The result was JavaScript. Ecih created the first version in 10 days as a way for developers to make pages more interactive and dynamic. It was primitive, but easy to grasp, and powerful. Since then, it has become one of the most popular programming languages in the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Microsoft wasn\u2019t far behind. But Netscape felt confident. They had pulled off the most ambitious product the web had ever seen. \u201cIn a fight between a bear and an alligator, what determines the victor is the terrain,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Architects-Web-Built-Future-Business\/dp\/0471171875\/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&amp;keywords=architects+of+the+web&amp;qid=1633650701&amp;s=books&amp;sr=1-1\">Andreessen said in an interview from the early days of Netscape<\/a>. \u201cWhat Microsoft just did was move into our terrain\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>There\u2019s an old adage at Microsoft, that it never gets something right until version 3.0. It was true even of their flagship product, Windows, and has notoriously been true of its most famous applications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The first version of Internet Explorer was a rushed port of the Mosaic code that acted as little more than a a public statement that Microsoft was going into the browser business. The second version, released just after Netscape\u2019s IPO in late 1995, saw rapid iteration, but lagged far behind. With Internet Explorer 3, Microsoft began to get the browser right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Microsoft\u2019s big, showy press conference hyped Internet Explorer as a true market challenger. Behind the scenes, it operated more like a skunkworks experiment. Six people were on the original product team. In a company of tens of thousands. \u201cA bit like the original Mac team, the IE team felt like the vanguard of Microsoft,\u201d one-time Internet Explorer lead&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.computerworld.com\/article\/2147006\/internet-explorer-rise-fall-rehabilitation.amp.html\">Brad Silverberg would later say<\/a>, \u201cthe vanguard of the industry, fighting for its life.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That changed quickly. Once Microsoft recognized the potential of the web, they shifted their weight to it. In&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Speeding-Net-Netscape-Challenged-Microsoft\/dp\/0871137097\"><em>Speeding the Net<\/em><\/a>, a comprehensive account of the rise of Netscape and its fall at the hands of Microsoft, authors Josh Quittner and Michelle Slatall, describe the Microsoft strategy. \u201cIn a way, the quality of it didn\u2019t really matter. If the first generation flopped, Gates could assign a team of his best and brightest programmers to write an improved model. If that one failed too, he could hire even better programmers and try again. And again. And again. He had nearly unlimited resources.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By version 3, the Internet Explorer team had a hundred people on it (including Chris Wilson of the original NCSA Mosaic team). That number would reach the thousands in a few short years. The software rapidly closed the gap. Internet Explorer introduced features that had given Netscape an edge\u2014and even introduced their own HTML extensions, dynamic animation tools for developers, and rudimentary support of CSS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the summer of 1996, Walt Mossberg talked up Microsoft\u2019s browsers. Only months prior he had labeled Netscape Navigator the \u201cclear victor.\u201d But he was&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/waltmossberg\/status\/1051470059133112320\">beginning to change his mind<\/a>. \u201cI give the edge, however, to Internet Explorer 3.0,\u201d he wrote upon Microsoft\u2019s version 3. \u201cIt\u2019s a better browser than Navigator 3.0 because it is easier to use and has a cleaner, more flexible user interface.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/s_5FF523D94D15886EBB3BCF2736DB1D25E44231CAD152A96C78FA0E975184F011_1635183964917_IE-3-WEB.png\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Microsoft Internet Explorer 3.0.01152<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/s_5FF523D94D15886EBB3BCF2736DB1D25E44231CAD152A96C78FA0E975184F011_1635183867193_iu.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Netscape Navigator 3.04<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Still, most Microsoft executives knew that competing on features would never be enough. In December of 1996, senior VP James Allchin emailed his boss, Paul Maritz. He laid out the current strategy, an endless chase after Netscape\u2019s feature set. \u201cI don\u2019t understand how IE is going to win,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/atr\/file\/704876\/download\">Allchin conceded<\/a>, \u201cMy conclusion is that we must leverage Windows more.\u201d In the same email, he added, \u201cWe should think first about an integrated solution \u2014 that is our strength.\u201d Microsoft was not about to simply lie down and allow themselves to be beaten. They focused on two things: integration with Windows and wider distribution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>When it was released, Internet Explorer 4 was more tightly integrated with the operating system than any previous version; an almost inseparable part of the Windows package. It could be used to browse files and folders. Its \u201cpush\u201d technology let you stream the web, even when you weren\u2019t actively using the software. It used internal APIs that were unavailable to outside developers to make the browser faster, smoother, and readily available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And then there was distribution. Days after Netscape and AOL shook on a deal to include their browser on the AOL platform, AOL abruptly changed their mind and when with Internet Explorer instead. It would later be revealed that Microsoft had made them, as one&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/SB909511614592827000\">writer put it<\/a>&nbsp;(extending&nbsp;<em>The Godfather<\/em>&nbsp;metaphor once more), an \u201coffer they couldn\u2019t refuse.\u201d Microsoft had dropped their prices down to the floor and\u2014more importantly\u2014promised AOL precious real estate pre-loaded on the desktop of every copy of the next Windows release.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Microsoft fired their second salvo with Compaq. Up to that point, all Compaq computers had shipped with Netscape pre-installed on Windows. When Windows threatened to suspend their license to use Windows at all (which was revealed later in court documents), that changed to Internet Explorer too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By the time Windows \u201998 was released, Internet Explorer 4 came already installed, free for every user, and impossible to remove.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cMozilla!\u201d interjected Jamie Zawinski.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Speeding-Net-Netscape-Challenged-Microsoft\/dp\/0871137097\">He was in a meeting at the time<\/a>, which now rang in deafening silence for just a moment. Heads turned. Then, they kept going.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This was early days at Netscape. A few employees from engineering and marketing huddled together to try to come up with a name for the thing. One employee suggested they were going to crush Mosaic, like a bug. Zawinski\u2014with a dry, biting humor he was well known for\u2014thought Mozilla, \u201cas in Mosaic meets Godzilla.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Eventually, marketer Greg Sands settled on Netscape. But around the office, the browser was, from then on, nicknamed Mozilla. Early marketing materials on the web even featured a Mozilla inspired mascot, a green lizard with a know-it-all smirk, before they shelved it for something more professional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/s_5FF523D94D15886EBB3BCF2736DB1D25E44231CAD152A96C78FA0E975184F011_1635185019340_first.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Credit:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.davetitus.com\/mozilla\/\">Dave Titus<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/s_5FF523D94D15886EBB3BCF2736DB1D25E44231CAD152A96C78FA0E975184F011_1635185037517_welcome_no_mosaic.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Credit:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.davetitus.com\/mozilla\/\">Dave Titus<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/cool_mosaic_tricks.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354927\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Credit:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.davetitus.com\/mozilla\/\">Dave Titus<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>It would be years before the name would come back in any public way; and Zawinski would have a hand in that too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Zawinski had been with Netscape since almost the beginning. He was employee number 20, brought in right after Rosanne Siino, to replace the work that Andreessen had done at NCSA working on the flagship version of Netscape for X-Windows. By the time he joined, he already had something of a reputation for solving complex technical challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/102695717-03-01.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354930\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Jaime&nbsp;Zawinski<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Zawinski\u2019s earliest memories of programming date back to eighth grade. In high school, he was a terrible student. But he still managed to get a job after school as a programmer, working on the one thing that managed to keep him interested: code. After that, he started work for the startup Lucid, Inc., which boasted a strong pedigree of programming legends at its helm. Zawinski worked on the Common Lisp programming language and the popular IDE Emacs; technologies revered in the still small programming community. By virtue of his work on the projects, Zawinski had instant credibility among the tech elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At Netscape, the engineering team was central to the way things worked. It was why Siino had chosen to meet with members of that team as soon as she began, and why she crafted the story of Netscape around the way they operated. The result was a high-pressure, high-intensity atmosphere so indispensable company that it would become party of the companies mythology. They moved so quickly that&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.fastcompany.com\/26443\/can-you-work-netscape-time\">many began to call such a rapid pace of development \u201cNetscape Time.\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cIt was really a great environment. I really enjoyed it,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/codersatwork.com\/\">Zawinski would later recall<\/a>. \u201cBecause everyone was so sure they were right, we fought constantly but it allowed us to communicate fast.\u201d But tempers did flare (one article details a time when he threw a chair against the wall and left abruptly for two weeks after his computer crashed), and many engineers would later reflect on the toxic workplace. Zawinski once put it simply: \u201cIt wasn\u2019t healthy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Still, engineers had a lot of sway at the organization. Many of them, Zawinski included, were advocates of free software. \u201cI guess you can say I\u2019ve been doing free software since I\u2019ve been doing software,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bookshop.org\/books\/rebel-code-linux-and-the-open-source-revolution\/9780738206707\">he would later say in an interview<\/a>. For Zawinski, software was meant to be free. From his earliest days on the Netscape project, he advocated for a more free version of the browser. He and others on the engineering team were at least partly responsible for the creative licensing that went into the company\u2019s \u201cfree, but not free\u201d business model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 1997, technical manager Frank Hecker breathed new life into the free software paradigm. He wrote a 30-page whitepaper proposing what several engineers had wanted for years\u2014to release the entire source of the browser for free. \u201cThe key point I tried to make in the document,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.openoffice.org\/editorial\/ec1May.html\">Hecker asserted<\/a>, \u201cwas that in order to compete effectively Netscape needed more people and companies working with Netscape and invested in Netscape\u2019s success.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With the help of CTO Eric Hahn, Hecker and Zawinski made their case all the way to the top. By the time they got in the room with James Barksdale, most of the company had already come around to the idea. Much to everyone\u2019s surprise, Barksdale agreed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On January 23, 1998, Netscape made two announcements. The first everyone expected. Netscape had been struggling to compete with Microsoft for nearly a year. The most recent release of Internet Explorer version 4, bundled directly into the Windows operating system for free, was capturing ever larger portions of their market share. So Netscape announced it would be giving its browser away for free too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The next announcement came as a shock. Netscape was going open source. The browser\u2019s entire source code\u2014millions of lines of code\u2014would be released to the public and open to contributions from anybody in the world. Led by Netscape veterans like Michael Toy, Tara Hernandez, Scott Collins, and Jamie Zawinski, the team would have three months to excise the code base and get it ready for public distribution. The effort had a name too: Mozilla.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/mozilla-firefox-1-0.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354931\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Firefox 1.0 (Credit:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.webdesignmuseum.org\/web-design-history\/mozilla-firefox-1-0-2004\">Web Design Museum<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>On the surface, Netscape looked calm and poised to take on Microsoft with the force of the open source community at their wings. Inside the company, things looked much different. The three months that followed were filled with frenetic energy, close calls, and unparalleled pace. Recapturing the spirit of the earliest days of innovation at Netscape, engineers worked frantically to patch bugs and get the code ready to be released to the world. In the end, they did it, but only by the skin of their teeth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the process, the project spun out into an independent organization under the domain Mozilla.org. It was staffed entirely by Netscape engineers, but Mozilla was not technically a part of Netscape. When Mozilla held a launch party in April of 1998, just months after their public announcement, it didn\u2019t just have Netscape members in attendance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Zawinski had organized the party, and he insisted that a now growing community of people outside the company who had contributed to the project be a part of it. \u201cWe\u2019re giving away the code. We\u2019re sharing responsibility for development of our flagship product with the whole net, so we should invite them to the party as well,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www-archive.mozilla.org\/party\/1998\/page1.html\">he said,<\/a>&nbsp;adding, \u201cIt\u2019s a new world.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>On the day of his testimony in November of 1998, Steve McGeady sat,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2000\/11\/microsoft-7\/\">as one writer described<\/a>, \u201cmotionless in the witness box.\u201d He had been waiting for this moment for a long time; the moment when he could finally reveal, in his view, the nefarious and monopolist strain that coursed through Microsoft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Department of Justice had several key witnesses in their antitrust case against Microsoft, but McGeady was a linchpin. As Vice President at Intel, McGeady had regular dealings with Microsoft; and his company stood outside of the Netscape and Microsoft conflict. There was an extra layer of tension to his particular testimony though. \u201cThe drama was heightened immeasurably by one stark reality,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2000\/11\/microsoft-7\/\">noted in one journalist\u2019s accounting of the trial<\/a>, \u201cnobody\u2014literally, nobody\u2014knew what McGeady was going to say.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>When he got his chance to speak, McGeady testified that high-ranking&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theringer.com\/tech\/2018\/5\/18\/17362452\/microsoft-antitrust-lawsuit-netscape-internet-explorer-20-years\">Microsoft executives had told him that their goal was to \u201ccut off Netscape\u2019s air supply.\u201d<\/a>&nbsp;Using their monopoly position in the operating system market, Microsoft threatened computer manufacturers\u2014many of whom Intel had regular dealings\u2014to ship their computers with Internet Explorer or face having their Windows licenses revoked entirely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Drawing on the language Bill Gates used in his announcement of Internet Explorer, McGeady claimed that one executive had laid out their strategy: \u201cembrace, extend and extinguish.\u201d According to his allegations, Microsoft never intended to enter into a competition with Netscape. They were ready to use every aggressive tactic and walk the line of legality to crush them. It was a major turning point for the case and a massive win for the DOJ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The case against Microsoft, however, had begun years earlier, when Netscape retained a team from the antitrust law firm Sonsini Goodrich &amp; Rosati in the summer of 1995. The legal team included outspoken anti-Microsoft crusader Gary Reback, as well as Susan Creighton. Reback would be the most public member of the firm in the coming half-decade, but it would be Creighton\u2019s contributions that would ultimately turn the attention of the DOJ. Creighton began her career as a clerk for Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O\u2019Conner. She quickly developed a reputation for precision and thoroughness. Her patterned, deliberate and methodical approach made her a perfect fit for a full and complete breakdown of Microsoft\u2019s anti-competitive strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/s_5FF523D94D15886EBB3BCF2736DB1D25E44231CAD152A96C78FA0E975184F011_1635185798425_10462.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Susan Creighton (Credit:&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsgr.com\/en\/people\/susan-creighton.html\">Wilson Sonsini Goorich &amp; Rosati<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Creighton\u2019s work with Netscape led her to write a two-hundred and twenty-two page document detailing the anti-competitive practices of Microsoft.&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2000\/11\/microsoft-7\/\">She laid out her case plain, and simply<\/a>. \u201cIt is about a monopolist (Microsoft) that has maintained its monopoly (desktop operating systems) for more than ten years. That monopoly is threatened by the introduction of a new technology (Web software)\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The document was originally planned as a book, but Netscape feared that if the public knew just how much danger they were in from Microsoft, their stock price would plummet. Instead, Creighton and Netscape handed it off the Department of Justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Inside the DOJ, it would trigger a renewed interest in ongoing antitrust investigations of Microsoft. Years of subpoenaing, information gathering, and lengthy depositions would follow. After almost three years, in May of 1998, the Department of Justice and 20 state attorneys filed an antitrust suit against Microsoft, a company which had only just then crossed over a 50% share of the browser market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cNo firm should be permitted to use its monopoly power to develop a chokehold on the browser software needed to access the Internet,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/archive\/atr\/public\/press_releases\/1998\/1764.htm\">announced Janet Reno<\/a>\u2014the prosecuting attorney general under President Clinton\u2014when charges were brought against Microsoft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the center of the trial was not necessarily the stranglehold Microsoft had on the software of personal computers\u2014not technically an illegal practice. It was the way they used their monopoly to directly counter competition in other markets. For instance, the practice threatening to revoke licenses to manufacturers that packaged computers with Netscape. Netscape\u2019s account of the June 1995 meeting factored in as well (when Andreessen was asked why he had taken such detailed notes on the meeting,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/2000\/11\/microsoft-7\/\">he replied<\/a>&nbsp;\u201cI thought that it might be a topic of discussion at some point with the US government on antitrust issues.\u201d)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Throughout the trial, both publicly and privately, Microsoft reacted to scrutiny poorly. They insisted that they were right; that they were doing what was best for the customers. In interviews and depositions, Bill Gates would often come off as curt and dismissive, unable or unwilling to yield to any cessation of power. The company insisted that the browser and operating system were co-existent, one could not live without the other\u2014a fact handily refuted by the judge when he noted that he had managed to uninstall Internet Explorer from Windows in \u201cless than 90 seconds.\u201d The trial became a national sensation as tech enthusiasts and news junkies waited with bated breath for each new revelation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/860x394.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354933\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Microsoft President Bill Gates, left, testifies on Capitol Hill, and Tuesday, March 3, 1998. (Credit: Ken Cedeno\/AP file photo)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>In November of 1999, the presiding judge issued his ruling. Microsoft had, in fact, used its monopoly power and violated antitrust laws. That was followed in the summer of 2000 by a proposed remedy: Microsoft was to be broken up into two separate companies, one to handle its operating software, and the other its applications. \u201cWhen Microsoft has to compete by innovating rather than reaching for its crutch of the monopoly, it will innovate more; it will have to innovate more. And the others will be free to innovate,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.c-span.org\/video\/?157585-1\/microsoft-antitrust-ruling-reaction\">Iowa State Attorney General Tom Miller said after the judge\u2019s ruling was announced<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That never happened. An appeal in 2002 resulted in a reversal of the ruling and the Department of Justice agreed to a lighter consent decree. By then, Internet Explorer\u2019s market share stood at around 90%. The browser wars were, effectively, over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAre you looking for an alternative to Netscape and Microsoft Explorer? Do you like the idea of having an MDI user interface and being able to browse in multiple windows?\u2026 Is your browser slow? Try Opera.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/g\/comp.infosystems.www.browsers.ms-windows\/c\/XIlBH6cBWoQ\/m\/wqsmYKJe1uMJ\">That short message announced Opera<\/a>&nbsp;to the world for the first time in April of 1995, posted by the browser\u2019s creators to a Usenet forum about Windows. The tone of the message\u2014technically meticulous, a little pointed, yet genuinely idealistic\u2014reflected the philosophy of Opera\u2019s creators, Jon Stephenson von Tetzchner and Geir Ivars\u00f8y. Opera, they claimed, was well-aligned with the ideology of the web.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Opera began as a project run out of the Norwegian telecommunications firm Telnor. Once it became stable, von Tetzchner and Ivars\u00f8y rented space at Telnor to spin it out into an independent company. Not long after, they posted that announcement and released the first version of the Opera web browser.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The team at Opera was small, but focused and effective, loyal to the open web. \u201cBrowsers are in our blood,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/magyaropera.blog.hu\/2009\/02\/07\/magyaropera_s_interview_with_jon_s_von_tetzchner\">Tetzchner would later say<\/a>. Time and time again, the Opera team would prove that. They were staffed by the web\u2019s true believers, and have often prided themselves on leading the development of web standards and an accessible web.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the mid-to-late 90\u2019s, Geir Ivars\u00f8y was the first person to implement the CSS standard in any browser, in Opera 3.5. That would prove more than enough to convince the creator of CSS, H\u00e5kon Wium Lie, to join the company as CTO. Ian Hickson worked at Opera during the time he developed the CSS Acid Test at the W3C.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/css-acid-test.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354934\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The original CSS Acid Test&nbsp;(Credit:&nbsp;<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/meyerweb.com\/eric\/thoughts\/2021\/06\/02\/ancestors-and-descendants\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Eric Meyer<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The company began developing a version of their browser for low-powered mobile devices in developing nations as early as 1998. They have often tried to push the entire web community towards web standards, leading when possible by example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Years after the antitrust lawsuit of Microsoft, and resulting reversal in the appeal, Opera would find themselves embroiled in a conflict on a different front of the browser wars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2007, Opera filed a complaint with the European Commission. Much like the case made by Creighton and Netscape, Opera alleged that Microsoft was abusing its monopoly position by bundling new versions of Internet Explorer with Windows 7. The EU had begun to look into allegations against Microsoft almost as soon as the Department of Justice, but the Opera complaint added a substantial and recent area of inquiry. Opera claimed that Microsoft was limiting user choice by making opaque additional browser options. \u201cYou could add more browsers, to give consumers a real choice between browsers, you put them in front of their eyeballs,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/blog.seattlepi.com\/microsoft\/2007\/12\/13\/qanda-opera-cto-on-microsoft-antitrust-complaint\/\">Lie said at the time of the complaint<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In Opera\u2019s summary of their complaints they evoked in themselves the picture of a free and open web. Opera, they argued, were advocates of a web as the web was intended\u2014accessible, universal, and egalitarian. Once again citing the language of \u201cembrace, extend, and extinguish,\u201d the company also&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.neowin.net\/news\/opera-latest-victim-in-microsoft-anti-trust-claim\/\">called out Microsoft for trying to take control over the web standards process<\/a>. \u201cThe complaint calls on Microsoft to adhere to its own public pronouncements to support these standards, instead of stifling them with its notorious \u2018Embrace, Extend and Extinguish\u2019 strategy,\u201d it read.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/01\/browser-ballot-2-640x409-1.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-354935\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The browser&nbsp;\u201cballot&nbsp;box\u201c&nbsp;(Credit:&nbsp;<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/arstechnica.com\/tech-policy\/2012\/07\/windows-7-sp1-technical-error-violated-microsofts-antitrust-deal\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Ars Technica<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>In 2010, the European Commission issued a ruling, forcing Microsoft to show a so-called \u201cballot box\u201d to European users of Windows\u2014a website users could see the first time they accessed the Internet that listed twelve alternative browsers to download, including Opera and Mozilla. Microsoft included this website in their European Windows installs for five years, until their obligation lapsed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>Netscape Navigator 5 never shipped. It echoes, unreleased, in the halls of software\u2019s most public and recognized vaporware.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After Netscape open-sourced their browser as part of the Mozilla project, the focus of the company split. Between being acquired by AOL and continuing pressure from Microsoft, Netscape was on its last legs. The public trial of Microsoft brought some respite, but too little, too late. \u201cIt\u2019s one of the great ironies here,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theringer.com\/tech\/2018\/5\/18\/17362452\/microsoft-antitrust-lawsuit-netscape-internet-explorer-20-years\">Netscape lawyer Gary Reback would later say,<\/a>&nbsp;\u201cafter years of effort to get the government to do something, by [1998] Netscape\u2019s body is already in the morgue.\u201d Meanwhile, management inside of Netscape couldn\u2019t decide how best to integrate with the Mozilla team. Rather than work alongside the open-source project, they continued to maintain a version of Netscape separate and apart from the public project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In October of 1998, Brendan Eich\u2014who was part of the core Mozilla team\u2014<a href=\"https:\/\/www-archive.mozilla.org\/roadmap\/roadmap-26-oct-1998\">published a post to the Mozilla blog<\/a>. \u201cIt\u2019s time to stop banging our heads on the old layout and FE codebase,\u201d he wrote. \u201cWe\u2019ve pulled more useful miles out of those vehicles than anyone rightly expected. We now have a great new layout engine that can view hundreds of top websites.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Many Mozilla contributors agreed with the sentiment, but the rewrite Eich proposed would spell the project\u2019s initial downfall. While Mozilla tinkered away on a new rendering engine for the browser\u2014which would soon be known as Gecko\u2014Netscape scrapped its planned version 5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Progress ground to a halt. Zawinski, one of the Mozilla team members opposed to the rewrite, would later describe his frustration&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/1999\/04\/netscape-browser-guru-we-failed\/\">when he resigned from Netscape in 1999<\/a>. \u201cIt constituted an almost-total rewrite of the browser, throwing us back six to 10 months. Now we had to rewrite the entire user interface from scratch before anyone could even browse the Web, or add a bookmark.\u201d Scott Collins, one of the original Netscape programmers,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/arstechnica.com\/information-technology\/2004\/06\/collins-interview\/2\/\">would put it less diplomatically<\/a>: \u201cYou can\u2019t put 50 pounds of crap in a ten pound bag, it took two years. And we didn\u2019t get out a 5.0, and that cost us&nbsp;<em>everything<\/em>, it was the biggest mistake ever.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The result was a world-class browser with great standards support and a fast-running browser engine. But it wasn\u2019t ready until April of 2000, when Netscape 6 was finally released. By then, Microsoft had eclipsed Netscape, owning 80% of the browser market. It would never be enough to take back a significant portion of that browser share.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cI really think the browser wars are over,\u201d&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.computerworld.com\/article\/2595035\/netscape-6-beta-released---users--too-little--too-late.html\">said one IT exec after the release of Netscape 6<\/a>. He was right. Netscape would sputter out for years. As for Mozilla, that would soon be reborn as something else entirely.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Audio Version by Jeremy Keith Articles RSS&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;Audio RSS \u00b7 iTunes&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;Spotify&nbsp;\u00b7&nbsp;Overcast In June of 1995, representatives from Microsoft arrived at the Netscape offices. The stated goal was to find ways to work together\u2014Netscape as the single dominant force in the browser market and Microsoft as a tech giant just beginning to consider the implications of the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":10,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-77","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/77","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/77\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":90,"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/77\/revisions\/90"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thehistoryoftheweb.com\/book\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}